Post by arfankj4 on Mar 7, 2024 5:40:04 GMT
He then predicted the likelihood of SEC enforcement according to his measure of employment intensity presenting his findings in the paper Government Preferences and SEC Enforcement. The data supported Heese s hypothesis. Companies in the top percent of employment intensity were percent less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC even when controlling for firm size performance accounting quality location and political contributions among other factors. What s more.
Heese learned these firms were even less likely to be convicted if they were headquartered in the district of a senior congressperson overseeing the SEC or located within a state with a closely contested election during an election year. In the latter case high employment Poland Mobile Number List firms were percent less likely to be sanctioned than those in the bottom tier. These results suggest that while the reason for preferential treatment in this case may be different from that of special interest pressure the mechanism may be the same influence from politicians. The assumption is there may be political pressure on which firms to investigate says Heese who surmises that politicians pressure regulators to go easier on firms that help them achieve their political ends such as higher employment.
Typically in research on regulatory capture special interests put pressure on politicians for example firms pay money in my story it comes because a politician wants to be reelected and therefore caters to voters interests. It s not just the Heese found. In another study Heese looked at regulation by Medicare of hospital fraud. It s an all too common practice for hospitals to claim patient ailments more serious than they actually were and overcharge Medicare by upcoding them to a more serious diagnosis that would be reimbursed at a higher rate.
Heese learned these firms were even less likely to be convicted if they were headquartered in the district of a senior congressperson overseeing the SEC or located within a state with a closely contested election during an election year. In the latter case high employment Poland Mobile Number List firms were percent less likely to be sanctioned than those in the bottom tier. These results suggest that while the reason for preferential treatment in this case may be different from that of special interest pressure the mechanism may be the same influence from politicians. The assumption is there may be political pressure on which firms to investigate says Heese who surmises that politicians pressure regulators to go easier on firms that help them achieve their political ends such as higher employment.
Typically in research on regulatory capture special interests put pressure on politicians for example firms pay money in my story it comes because a politician wants to be reelected and therefore caters to voters interests. It s not just the Heese found. In another study Heese looked at regulation by Medicare of hospital fraud. It s an all too common practice for hospitals to claim patient ailments more serious than they actually were and overcharge Medicare by upcoding them to a more serious diagnosis that would be reimbursed at a higher rate.